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Abstract
We report an experimental test of the inuence of ambiguity on behaviour in a co-
ordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and
attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity safe option. We nd
that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance
equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity aver-
sion inuences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent
with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference
for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
This paper reports an experimental study of the impact of ambiguity in games. Decisions
under uncertainty are said to be ambiguous if there are no objective probabilities given and it is
di¢ cult or impossible to assign subjective probabilities. There is by now a large experimental
literature which shows that ambiguity makes a di¤erence in single person decisions. For a
survey see, Camerer and Weber (1992). However most economic decisions are not made by
single individuals but by groups of individuals involved in strategic interactions. There is a
small experimental literature on ambiguity in games.1 However, most of these papers do not
test specic theories of the impact of ambiguity in games. It is thus di¢ cult to predict what
e¤ect ambiguity has, and in which direction it will cause behaviour to change. Our research
studies experimentally the comparative statics of ambiguity in games. In particular we test
whether the theory of equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA, Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper
(2009)) performs better than Nash equilibrium.2 We nd that ambiguity does a¤ect behaviour
in games. Moreover ambiguity appears to have a larger impact in games than in single person
decisions.
A game is a stylized way of representing a situation where a group of individuals have to make
a number of linked decisions and thus forms a model of many economic interactions. Games
provide a useful intermediate step between single person decisions and economic applications.
Since many economic problems can be represented as games we believe this research will be
useful for understanding the impact of ambiguity in economics.
1See for instance Colman and Pulford (2007), Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008), Ivanov (2011), Kelsey
and le Roux (2013) or Di Mauro and Castro (2011).
2The theory is based on earlier research by Dow and Werlang (1994) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2000).
1
1.2 The Experiments





T 0; 0 300; 100 50; x
B 100; 300 0; 0 55; x
Table 1: Battle of the Sexes with a secure option
The value of x, which is the safe option available to Player 2, varies every round in the range
60   260. For some values of x, the safe strategy (in our game, option R) is dominated by a
mixed strategy of L and M , and thus would not be played in a Nash equilibrium. For some
higher values of x the game is dominance solvable.
If players see a neutrally-framed Battle of Sexes game without a secure option; there are two
pure Nash equilibria, neither of which is focal. Even if a player wishes to use a Nash equilibrium
strategy they have to decide which one. Game theory does not provide guidance on how to
choose. Thus we believe that it is possible that subjects will perceive considerable ambiguity in
this game. Moreover, subjects played each round (with a varied x) just once, in our attempt to
make the game one shot. No feedback was provided to subjects between rounds. We expected
these conditions to lead subjects to perceive the games to be ambiguous.
The e¤ect of ambiguity-aversion is to make R (the ambiguity-safe option) attractive for
Player 2. This is never chosen in Nash equilibrium for the parameter values considered by us.
However it may be chosen when there is ambiguity. Moreover for some values of x; our games
are dominance solvable and R is not part of the equilibrium strategy. Despite this, we nd that
R is chosen quite frequently by subjects. While the Row Player appears to be randomising
50 : 50 between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding
ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy. Thus, ambiguity inuences behaviour in
the games. (We use the convention that female pronouns denote the row player and male
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pronouns denote the column player.)3
1.3 Results
During the experiment, we alternated the Battle of Sexes games with decision problems based
on the 3-ball Ellsberg urn. In these rounds, subjects were presented with an urn containing
90 balls, of which 30 were Red, and the remainder an unknown proportion of Blue or Yellow,
and asked to pick a colour to bet on. The payo¤ attached to Red was varied in order to obtain
an ambiguity threshold. Alternating experiments on urns and games had the dual aim of
erasing the short term memory of subjects, and providing an independent measure of subjects
ambiguity-attitudes.
Subjects appeared to perceive a greater level of ambiguity in the two-person coordination
game, than in the single person Ellsberg urn decision problem. We found that subjects chose
the ambiguity-safe option R in the game, but were unwilling to pay a penalty to choose Red
(the unambiguous option in the urn experiment). There are a number of possible probability
distributions which could describe the draw from the urn. Amongst these the one which assigns
equal probability to each colour is a most natural focal point. In contrast in an experiment on
games not only is the opponents behaviour ambiguous, there is also no clear focal probability
distribution.
Another di¤erence is that in single person decision problems a proxy for ambiguity is in-
troduced by the experimenter, using an articial device such as the Ellsberg urn. However in
games, ambiguity is created by the other subjects taking part in the experiment. Behaviour in
the nancial market is dependent on other people, and games can be used to e¤ectively model
such economic conditions. Natural disasters on the other hand, are more like single person
decision problems.
If ambiguity-attitude is a xed characteristic of the individual we would expect to see a
positive correlation between choosing the ball with known probability in the urn experiment
and choosing the safe strategy in games. In fact we found no statistically signicant correlation,
3Of course this convention is for convenience only and bears no relation to the actual gender of subjects in
our experiments.
3
which suggests that ambiguity-attitude varies a lot from one context to another. The di¤erences
between the games and the urn experiments suggest that, even for a given subject, ambiguity-
attitude is quite variable depending on the type of decision (s)he is making. A consequence of
this is that it will be di¢ cult to test theories by measuring ambiguity-attitude in one context
and then proceeding to use the measured ambiguity-attitude to predict behaviour in another
context.
Organisation of the Paper In Section 2, we describe the theory being tested in the ex-
periments. Section 3 describes the experimental design employed, Section 4 consists of data
analysis and results, Section 5 reviews related literature and Section 6 provides a summary of
results together with future avenues of research. The appendix contains the proofs of the main
results.
2 Preferences and Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In this section we explain neo-additive preferences which we use to model ambiguity. The model
is then developed into a theory of ambiguity in games.
2.1 Modelling Ambiguity
The Ellsberg paradox is a violation of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), Savage (1954).
One version of the paradox is explained below. Consider an urn lled with 90 balls, 30 of which
are red (R) and the remaining 60 are of an unknown mix of blue (B) and yellow (Y ). One ball
is drawn at random, and the payo¤depends on the colour of the ball drawn and the act chosen.
Subjects are asked to choose between acts f , g, f 0, g0 as shown in the table below (Pay-o¤s in
Experimental Currency Units - ECU):
Subjects asked to choose between f and g, generally prefer f because of the denite 1
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chance of winning 100 ECU to the ambiguous act g, but when asked to choose between f 0 and
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Table 1: The Ellsberg Options
30 balls 60 balls
Act Red R Blue B Yellow Y
f 100 0 0
g 0 100 0
f 0 100 0 100
g0 0 100 100
g0; the same subjects prefer g0; which gives a 2
3
chance of winning 100 ECU; again avoiding the
ambiguous act f 0.
These choices cannot be represented as maximising expected utility with respect to a stan-
dard subjective probability distribution : However these preferences are compatible with non-
additive beliefs, introduced by Schmeidler (1989). Such beliefs may be represented by a capacity
or non-additive set function . In this case it is possible that (R [ Y ) 6= (R) + (Y ), which
could be compatible with the choices in the Ellsberg paradox.4 Schmeidler (1989) proposed
a theory called Choquet Expected Utility (CEU), where outcomes are evaluated by a
weighted sum of utilities, but unlike EUT the weights used depend on the acts. The model
preserves additivity in beliefs when there is conventional risk, while permitting non-additivity
for ambiguous events. Within CEU individuals can be either optimistic or pessimistic in their
outlook towards ambiguity. An optimistic (resp. pessimistic) outlook would over-estimate the
likelihood of a good (resp. bad) outcome - inducing one to make risky decisions such as
investing in dotcom shares.
Neo-additive capacities were introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007).
In this model the decision-maker has beliefs based on an additive probability distribution :
However (s)he lacks condence in these beliefs hence they are ambiguous beliefs. The ambiguity
is represented by the parameter : The individuals attitude to ambiguity is represented by the
parameter ; with higher values of  corresponding to greater ambiguity-aversion. Consider a
two-player game with a nite set of pure strategies Si; such that si is the players own strategy
and S i denotes the set of possible strategy proles for is opponents. The payo¤ function of
4If v(R) > v(B) and v(R [ Y ) < v(B [ Y ); then these beliefs will be compatible with the Ellsberg Paradox.
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player i is denoted ui(si; s i): The functional form of preferences may be represented as:
Vi (si; i; i; i) = i (1  i)Mi (si) + iimi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i); (1)
where Mi (si) = maxs i2S i ui(si; s i) and mi (si) = mins i2S i ui(si; s i):
5 These preferences
maximise a weighted average of the best payo¤, the worst payo¤ and the expected payo¤. They
are a special case of CEU. They are also a special case of the -MEU model, ?, which represents
ambiguity by a set of probability distributions and ambiguity-attitude by the parameter 
expressing the weight given to the minimum possible expected utility.
Intuitively,  can be thought to be the decision-makers belief. However, he is not sure of
this belief, hence it is an ambiguous belief. His condence about it is modelled by (1   i);
with i = 1 denoting complete ignorance and i = 0 denoting no ambiguity. His attitude to
ambiguity is measured by i; with i = 1 denoting pure pessimism and i = 0 denoting pure
optimism. If the decision-maker has 0 < i < 1; he is neither purely optimistic nor purely
pessimistic (i.e., ambiguity-averse), but reacts to ambiguity in a partly pessimistic way by
putting a greater weight on bad outcomes and in a partly optimistic way by putting a greater
weight on good outcomes.
2.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In this section we present an equilibrium concept for strategic games with ambiguity. In a
Nash equilibrium, players are believed to behave in a manner that is consistent with the actual
behaviour of their opponents. They perfectly anticipate the actions of their opponent and can
thus provide a best response to it in the form of their own action. However, for non-additive
beliefs, the Nash idea of having consistent beliefs regarding the opponents action and thus
being able to play a best response to these beliefs, needs to be modied. We assume that
players choose pure strategies. In equilibrium, a players beliefs about the pure strategies of
his/her opponent must be best responses for that opponent, given the opponents beliefs.
5Note that Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) write a neo additive capacity in the form (E) =
+ (1  )(E): We have modied their denition to be consistent with the majority of the literature where
 is the weight on the minimum expected utility.
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Unlike Nash equilibrium where a player can assign an additive probability distribution to
his/her opponents actions, ambiguous beliefs are represented by capacities. The support of a
capacity is a players belief of how the opponent will act. Formally, the support of a neo-additive
capacity,  (A) =  + (1  ) (A), is dened by supp () = supp (). Thus the support of a
neo-additive belief is equal to the support of its additive component.6
Denition 2.1 (Equilibrium under Ambiguity) A pair of neo-additive capacities (1; 

2)
is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA), for i = 1; 2 and supp (i )  R i( i); where Ri
denotes the best-response correspondence of player i; given that his/her beliefs are represented
by i and is dened by:
Ri(i) = Ri(i; i; i) := argmaxsi2Si Vi (si; i; i; i) :
This denition of equilibrium is taken from Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009), who
adapt an earlier denition in Dow and Werlang (1994). These papers show that an EUA
will exist for any given ambiguity-attitudes for the players. In games, one can determine i
endogenously as the prediction of the players from the knowledge of the game structure and the
preferences of others. In contrast, we treat the degrees of optimism, i and ambiguity, i; as
exogenous. In equilibrium, each player assigns strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponents
best responses given the opponents belief. However, each player lacks condence in his/her
likelihood assessment and responds in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome,
or in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome.
Alternative approaches to equilibrium with ambiguity can be found in Klibano¤ (1993) and
Lo (1996). They model players as having preferences which satisfy the axioms of maxmin
expected utility (MMEU, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Players are allowed to have beliefs
which are represented by sets of conventional probability distributions. As such, players can
have mixed strategies that are chosen from these sets of probabilities. They model ambiguity
aversion as a strict preference among players to randomise between strategies when they are
6This denition is justied in Eichberger and Kelsey (2014).
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indi¤erent between two pure strategies.
3 Experimental Model
3.1 Battle of the Sexes Game
In this section, we explain the games used in our experimental sessions. These are similar to the
standard battle of the sexes game, except that they have been modied by giving the column
player an additional option which is secure.
As we argue in the introduction, we believe ambiguity will be high due to the multiplicity
of equilibria in the basic Battle of the Sexes game. When x = 60, R is dominated by a mixed
strategy and hence is not played in Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium.
The following results nds the Nash equilibria in our games. This sets a benchmark from
which we can measure the e¤ect of ambiguity.
Proposition 3.1 Our modied battle of sexes game has the following Nash equilibria
1. When 0 6 x 6 75; there are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and a mixed strategy equilibrium
(3
4







2. When 75 < x 6 100; there are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and ( x
100








3. When 100 < x < 300; there is a Nash unique equilibrium: (B;L); which is also an iterated
dominance equilibrium.
Ambiguity about the behaviour of Player 1 would make the secure option R more attractive
for Player 2. Note that the best response to R; is for Player 1 to play B. Hence of the two
possible Nash equilibria (T;M) and (B;L), the latter may be more robust to ambiguity.8
7The notation 34 T + 14 B denotes the mixed strategy where T is played with probability 34 and B is played
with probability 14 :
8Proposition 2 conrms that (B;L) is an equilibrium for a greater parameter range than (T;M):
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As described in Section 2.1, in CEU, convex capacities are used to model a pessimistic
outlook to ambiguity. Neo-additive capacities are a special case of CEU, where the functional
form of preferences may be represented as:
Vi (si; i; i; i) = i (1  i)Mi (si) + iimi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i); (2)
where Mi (si) = maxs i2S i ui(si; s i) and mi (si) = mins i2S i ui(si; s i): These preferences
maximise a weighted average of the best payo¤, the worst payo¤ and the expected payo¤.
Intuitively,  is the decision-makers ambiguous belief. His condence about the ambiguous
belief is modelled by (1  i); with i = 1 denoting complete ignorance and i = 0 denoting no
ambiguity. His attitude to ambiguity is measured by i; with i = 1 denoting pure pessimism
and i = 0 denoting pure optimism. If the decision-maker has 0 < i < 1; he is neither purely
optimistic nor purely pessimistic (i.e., ambiguity-averse). We assume that the beliefs of the
players may be represented by neo-additive capacities and that players are ambiguity-averse,
i.e.,  = 1:
Proposition 3.2 The game has the following Equilibria under Ambiguity for all i; where i;
is the degree of ambiguity of player i:




2. when (1  i)75 < x 6 (1  i)100; there are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and
x










3. when (1  i)100 < x < (1  i)300; there is a unique equilibrium: (B;L);
4. when x > (1  i)300; there is a unique equilibrium: (B;R):
Suppose i = 0:5; which is compatible with the ndings of Kilka and Weber (2001). Then
(a) occurs for 0 6 x 6 37:5; (b) occurs for 37:5 6 x 6 50; (c) occurs for 50 6 x 6 150 and (d)
occurs for 150 6 x:
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The testable hypothesis that arises from the analysis, is that while Nash equilibrium predicts
that R cannot be chosen in the range 37:5 < x < 50 or 150 < x < 300; EUA predicts R can be
chosen in these ranges.
3.2 Ellsberg Urn Experiments
The Battle of Sexes game was alternated with single person decision problems similar to the
Ellsberg Paradox. Subjects were presented with an urn containing 90 balls, of which 30 were
Red, and the remainder an unknown proportion of Blue or Yellow. Subjects were asked to pick
a colour, and a ball was drawn from the urn. If the colour of the ball matched the colour chosen
by the subject, it entitled the subject to a prize. The decisions put to the subjects took the
following form:
An urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are Red. The remainder are either Blue or Yellow.
Which of the following options do you prefer?
a) Payo¤ of y if a Red ball is drawn.
b) Payo¤ of 100 if a Blue ball is drawn.
c) Payo¤ of 100 if a Yellow ball is drawn.
Payo¤ yattached to the option Red was changed from round to round, with y = 95; 90
or 80; to measure the ambiguity threshold of subjects. In addition, we also put before subjects
the classic case of Ellsberg Paradox, when y = 100, as described in Table 3.
4 Experimental Design
The Battle of Sexes game and Ellsberg Urn problem described above were used in two series
of paper-based experiments, one conducted at St. Stephens College in New Delhi, India, and
the other at the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory in Exeter (FEELE), UK.
We conducted two sets of experiments in order to check that the response to ambiguity was
consistent across locations.
Sessions 1 and 2 consisted of 20 subjects each. Sessions 3 and 4 consisted of 18 and 22
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subjects respectively. In total there were 80 subjects who took part in the experiment, 38 of
which were females and 42 were males. We were also interested in whether or not participants
had a mathematical background - of those taking part in the sessions, 45 studied a quantitative
subject such as Biochemistry, Electronic Engineering or Astrophysics, while 35 studied a non-
quantitative subject such as History, Philosophy, or International Relations. Each session lasted
a maximum of 45 minutes.
Subjects were allowed to read through a short but comprehensive set of instructions at their
own pace9, following which the instructions were also read out to all the participants in general.
The subjects were then asked to ll out some practice questions to test their understanding of
the games, before the actual set of experimental questions were handed out. At the start of
the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned the role of either a Row Player or a Column
Player for the purpose of the Battle of Sexes game, and remained in the same role throughout
the rest of the experiment.
The experiment consisted of 11 rounds, starting with a decision regarding a Battle of Sexes
game, which was then alternated with an Ellsberg Urn decision, such that there were in total
6 Battle of Sexes rounds and 5 Ellsberg urn decisions to be made. Each subject had to choose
one option per round: Top/Bottom if they were a Row Player or Left/Middle/Right if they
were a Column Player, and in case of the Ellsberg urn rounds Red, Blue or Yellow.
The values of x, the ambiguity-safe payo¤ available to the Column Player that were used
for the Battle of Sexes game rounds were: 230; 120, 200, 170, 260, 60 (in that order). In the
rst three Ellsberg urn rounds, the pay-o¤s attached to drawing a Blue or Yellow ball were
held constant at 100, while those attached to drawing a Red ball varied as 95, 90, 80: The last
two Ellsberg urn rounds consisted of the classic case of the Ellsberg paradox, where subjects
had to choose between a payo¤ of 100 for a Red or 100 for a Blue ball, followed by a choice
between a payo¤ of 100 for drawing a Red/Yellow ball or 100 for drawing a Blue/Yellow ball.
Once subjects had made all 11 decisions, a throw of dice determined one Battle of Sexes
round and one Ellsberg urn round for which payments were to be made. Row Playersdecisions
9Experimental protocols can be found here: http://saraleroux.weebly.com/experimental-protocols.html
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were matched against the Column Playersdecisions according to a random and anonymous
matching, and pay-o¤s were announced.10
Rather than using a real urn we simulated the draw from the urn on a computer.11 The
computer randomly assigned the number of blue and yellow balls in the urn so that they
summed to 60, while keeping the number of red balls xed at 30 and the total number of balls
in the urn at 90:12 It then simulated an independent ball draw for up to 30 subjects. If the
colour of the ball drawn by the computer matched that chosen by the subject, it entitled him
to the payo¤ specied in the round chosen for payment.
The total earnings of a subject was the sum of a show-up fee, payo¤ earned in the chosen
Battle of Sexes round and payo¤ earned in the chosen Ellsberg urn round. Average payment
made to Indian subjects was Rs:420 ($6 approximately); and to Exeter subjects was $7:40.
5 Data Analysis and Results
The levels of coordination in the Battle of Sexes game without the secure option, was about
50% (See Table 2); which is reasonable in an experimental game. To measure coordination we
discard those occasions on which Player 2 chose the secure option. We measure coordination
as the ratio of sucessful coordinations, i.e. either hT:Mi or hB;Li to the total number of plays
hT:Mi and hB;Li ; hT; Li and hB;Mi ; i.e.
prob(T;M) + pob(B;L)
prob(T;M) + prob(T; L) + prob(B;L) + prob(B;M)
:
Sara Since these are observations it is misleading to describe them as probabilities.
They are rather proportions of the actual data.
The players managed to coordinate on the pure Nash equilibria, (T:M) and (B;L); about
10For the purpose of the Indian experiments, 1ECU = Rs:1, while for the Exeter experiments, 100ECU = $2:
In addition, a show-up fee of Rs:250 was paid to the Indian subjects and $5 to the Exeter subjects:
11The computer simulated urn can be found at the following link: http://saraleroux.weebly.com/experimental-
protocols.html
12The programme was produced by the FEELE lab programmer, Tim Miller. Even the experimenters were
unaware of the processes determining the composition of the urn.
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50% of the time, which appears normal for this type of experiment.
Table 2: Coordination in the Battle of Sexes Game
x = 60 x = 120 x = 170 x = 200 x = 230 x = 260
50% 50% 51% 41% 60% 43%
5.1 Behaviour of the Row Player
In the Battle of Sexes rounds of the experiment, the task of the Row Player was to choose
between T and B: We nd that they individually and on aggregate, randomise closely to
50 : 50: See Figure 1, for a summary of the Row Players behaviour.
Figure 1: Row Player Behaviour
We conducted a binomial test with the null that the Row Player randomises 50 : 50 between
T and B; for each value of x: We fail to reject this hypothesis for each individual session even
at a 10% level of signicance. When tested for each value of x on the whole (as a sum of
all sessions combined), we fail to reject the null for all the values of x; except when x = 200;
where we reject the null at 5%: In the case where x = 200, the Row Player plays T signicantly
more often than B: This is puzzling, since B would be the best response to the Column Player
choosing R: A possible reason why the Row Player might choose T , might be that the total
payo¤ from T is greater than that of playing B:
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We conducted a chi-squared test with the null hypothesis that the Row Player chooses T
and B with equal probability (H0 : prob(T ) = 0:5, prob(B) = 0:5) versus the alternative that
this is not true (H1 : prob(T ) 6= 0:5): Again, we fail to reject this hypothesis even at the 10%
level.
5.2 Behaviour of the Column Player
In the Battle of Sexes rounds of the experiment, the task of the Column Player was to choose
between L; M and the ambiguity-safe option R: See Figure ??, for a summary of the Column
Players behaviour.
When x = 60 one might expect the Column Player to pick L; since L has a much higher
maximum pay-o¤ than M: As seen in Figure ?? most subjects do indeed choose L: However,
even at this low value of x, where the ambiguity-safe option R is dominated by randomisation
between the other strategies, a signicant 30% of subjects still choose it.13 What is more
interesting to note however, is that the number of subjects playing R, steadily increases from
73% to 98% for 120 6 x 6 260: Nash equilibrium predicts that R cannot be chosen for any of
these values, but it is the clear choice of a majority of subjects in the presence of ambiguity, as
seen in Figure ??.
According to Proposition 2, when x = 120; neither EUA nor Nash predicts that R would
be chosen, if i = 0:5 (as estimated by Kilka and Weber (2001)). In our data, we notice a
large number of subjects (73%) select R when x = 120: This would be compatible with EUA
if i = 0:6 (i.e., for a slightly higher i than estimated by the Kilka and Weber (2001) study):
If i = 0:6; then for Proposition 2, (a) occurs for 0 6 x 6 30; (b) occurs for 30 6 x 6 40; (c)
occurs for 40 6 x 6 120 and (d) occurs for 120 6 x: Nash equilibrium would predict that R
cannot be chosen in the range 120 < x < 300; while EUA would predict that R can be chosen
for x > 120: Thus, our data captures the preferences of some individuals who had a slightly
13Subjects remained in the same role throughout the game. It is thus possible that subjects could consider
the properties of the game more fully, as the rounds progressed, even though they were not given any feedback.
It may be noted that this "repeated" nature of play may have led to more Column Players choosing the option
R when x = 60; than is expected, as it was the last game round. These subjects may have got used to choosing
R and not re-optimised for the lower value of x:
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higher  parameter, than those who took part in the Kilka and Weber (2001) study, and is
compatible with EUA for i = 0:6.
We conducted a binomial test with the null that the Column Player chooses R as often as he
does L+M (H0 : prob(Right) = 0:5, prob(Left+Middle) = 0:5), against the alternative that
he plays R more often than both L+M combined (H1 : prob(Right) > prob(Left+Middle)),
for each value of x:14 We reject the null at a 1% level of signicance for all the values of x in
the range 120   260. This leads us to conclude that subjects play R signicantly more often
than both L and M combined, at a 1% level of signicance.
A chi-squared test with the null hypothesis that the Column Player chooses R and L +
M with equal probability (H0 : prob(Right) = 0:5, prob(Left + Middle) = 0:5) versus the
alternative that this is not true (H1 : prob(Right) 6= 0:5) is also rejected at the 1% level of
signicance, since R is chosen signicantly more often.
We ran a probit regression to ascertain what factors inuenced subjects in choosing R more
often than L or M . Dummy variables were dened to capture the characteristics of the data
such as: Math = 1, if the subject was doing a quantitative degree (Math = 0; for degrees
like English, History, Philosophy, Politics etc.); Male = 1, if gender is male (0; otherwise);
Delhi = 1, if the session was run in India (0; for Exeter); x_120; x_170; x_200; x_230;
x_260 = 1, depending on the value xtook in that particular round.15
A probit regression of Right on Math; Male, and the various x   value dummies x_120;
x_170; x_200; x_230; x_260; has a chi-square ratio of 75:55 with a p-value of 0:0001; which
14The binomial test was conducted for each value of x except x = 60, where EUA predicts that the column
player can play L: It may be noted that for x = 60; subjects play L+M more than 50% of the time.
15The dummy for x_60 was dropped from the probit regression, in order to avoid the dummy variable trap.
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shows that our model as a whole is statistically signicant.16 Regression results are seen below.17
Right =  0:6236 + 0:538Math  0:402Male+ 1:16(x_120) + 1:08(x_170)
+1:75(x_200) + 2:27(x_230) + 2:57(x_260)
All the variables in the probit regression were individually statistically signicant. We note
that if a subject had a quantitative degree, (s)he is more likely to choose R: Moreover, males
are less likely to opt for R than females, and as the value of x increases, the subject is more
likely to pick the ambiguity-safe option.
Next we consider alternative explanations for our results. A leading possibility is the cogni-
tive hierarchy model (Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)). Consider the case where x = 200: At
this value of x, a majority of Column Players choose to play R; even though R is not chosen
in a Nash equilibria. We now consider a cognitive-heirarchy, where Level   0 Column Players
play R with probability 1
3
; and Level 0 Row Players choose T and B with probability 50 : 50:
Level  1 Column Players would then choose to play R with probability 1; and Level  1 Row
Players would play B with probability 1: If Level  2 Column Players best respond to a belief
that Row Players are some mix of Level  0 and Level  1; it would lead them to choose R, if
they think the chance of Row being Level   1 is high enough. This argument suggests that a
Cognitive Hierarchy Model (CHM) where most Column Players are Level   1 or 2; could also
explain the frequent play of R in our game.
The disadvantage of using CHM is that it allows players to have arbitrary levels of rationality,
which can be adjusted freely. As such, it is unsurprising that it can be better tted to data.
The neo-additive preferences we use in EUA are derived from an axiomatic decision theory.
16An initial probit regression, showed that the dummy variable for location (Delhi=Exeter) was not signif-
icant. This re-inforced our beliefs that the behaviour of the Indian subjects was very similar to that of the
Exeter subjects. Thus, the location dummy variable was dropped and the model was re-run without it.
17The coe¢ cients from a probit regression do not have the same interpretation as coe¢ cients from an Ordinary
Least Squares regression. From the probit results, we can interpret that if a subject had a quantitative degree,
his z-score increases by 0:538; making him more likely to pick R: If the subject is male, the z-score decreases
by 0:402; hence males are less likely to opt for the ambiguity-safe option R than females. When x = 120: the
z-score increases by 1:16; for x = 170: the z-score increases by 1:08; for x = 200: the z-score increases by 1:75;
for x = 230: the z-score increases by 2:27; for x = 260 : the z-score increases by 2:57; more than the base which
is x = 60:
16
There is no corresponding axiomatic theory behind level-k equilibrium. In this respect, EUA is
more rigorous, in that it puts constraints on the parameters measuring the ambiguity attitude
and the level of ambiguity faced by subjects. Moreover as Kilka and Weber (2001) show
these parameters can be measured. A persons ambiguity attitude ( parameter, capturing
optimism/pessimism) is a personal characteristic, and may be taken as given. The level of
ambiguity (-parameter) on the other hand, is dependant on the situation he/she is facing. For
instance, the level of ambiguity experienced in a one-shot game would be much higher than
that of a repeated game, where players can update beliefs to incorporate learning. Hence, the
testable hypothesis generated by EUA does not have an analogous counter part for the CHM
model. In particular, the advantage of using EUA is that it can explain diverging behaviour in
a number of games, using the same set of ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude parameters. See
Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008) or Kelsey and le Roux (2013) for experimental tests
of EUA on other games.
5.3 Player Behaviour in the Ellsberg Urn Rounds
The Ellsberg Urn rounds were alternated with the Battles of Sexes rounds. This was designed
to test whether there was a correlation between ambiguity-averse behaviour in the game and
ambiguity attitude in single person decision problems.18
As can be seen in Figure ??, subjects chose Blue and Yellow coloured balls (the ambiguous
option) more often than they chose Red :19 This was designed to test whether subjects who
chose Right (the ambiguity-safe option) in the Battle of Sexes rounds, would choose Red (the
colour with the unambiguous number of balls) in the Urn rounds. In practice, the observed
correlation was weak.20
One notable feature of this data is the low level of ambiguity-aversion compared to previous
studies. In the case where y = 100 our results are comparable to the previous literature. For
18We would like to thank Peter Dursch, whose suggestions helped the design of the experiment.
19The data for y = 100 is from the classic Ellsberg paradox round. It is not completely comparable, as
subjects were not given the option of choosing yellow.
20Only 12 of the 80 subjects that took part in our experiment always chose Red ; 3 of these subjects were
Row Players and thus do not have an ambiguity-safe option. As such, the Pearson correlation between choosing
Right in the game round and Red in the Urn round was close to zero.
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lower values of y; subjects have to pay a monetary penalty to avoid ambiguity. Even small
penalties produced a large drop in the number of subjects choosing the unambiguous option.
Of the 57 subjects who chose Red when y = 100, 29 switched away from Red when y = 95;
7 switched at y = 90; 6 switched at y = 80, while 12 subjects never switched away from Red
(even at lower levels of y).21 Moreover for values of y = 95=90=80; of the 80 subjects that took
part in the experiment, only 12 always chose Red, 11 chose Red twice, 20 chose Red once, and a
signicant 37 subjects never chose Red - always opting for either Blue or Yellow, the ambiguous
options.
It is interesting to note that even in the round where the payo¤ attached to Red was 80
ECU; a large minority (30%) still chose the unambiguous option, despite facing a substantial
monetary penalty. Of the 12 subjects who always picked Red, 3 are Row Players and so not
relevant to our discussion. The remaining 9 are Column Players: 7 of these always chose the
ambiguity-safe combination of Right Red (not considering their choice when x = 60), while 2
chose Left/Middle/Right while always picking Red.
We conducted a binomial test with the null that Red was chosen as often as Blue+Yellow
combined (H0 : prob(Red) = 0:5, prob(Blue + Yellow) = 0:5), against the alternative that
Blue+Yellow was chosen more often (H1 : prob(Blue + Yellow) > prob(Red)): We reject the
null at a 5% level of signicance when the payo¤ attached to Red = 95, and at 1% level of
signicance when Red = 90 & 80: Looking at subject choices on the whole, over the three
rounds, we can reject the null at a 1% level of signicance.
Thus, the ambiguous options Blue and Yellow are chosen signicantly more often than Red ;
which leads us to speculate whether the penalty for choosing Red was set too high or whether
subjects are mildly ambiguity-seeking in the Ellsberg urn rounds, even though they appear
to be ambiguity-averse in the Battle of Sexes rounds. A probit regression run to investigate
whether gender, location or degree subject a¤ected subjectschoice of Blue and Yellow was
inconclusive and none of these potential explanatory variables were found to be signicant.
21We ignore the subjects who switch multiple times between Red and Blue/Yellow. Such subjects may have
been (incorrectly) using the notion of diversifying a portfolio.
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5.4 Classic Ellsberg Paradox Rounds
In the last two urn rounds, the classic Ellsberg Paradox was put before the subjects. As can be
seen from Table 3, a majority of them preferred Red to Blue; followed by the choice Blue=Yellow
(rather than Red=Yellow): 38 of the 80 (48%) subjects chose Red followed by Blue=Yellow; thus
displaying the Classic Ellsberg Paradox. The opposite preference was expressed by 7 (9%) of
the subjects. They subjects chose Blue followed by Red=Yellow; which indicates an ambiguity
preference. Looking strictly at the Column Players who display the Ellsberg Paradox22: 16
(67%) subjects always chose the ambiguity-safe option Right   but these people do choose
Blue=Yellow when the payo¤ attached to Red = 95; 90; 80, while 8 (33%) play a mixture of
Left/Middle/Right.
Table 3: Player Behaviour in Classic Ellsberg Paradox Rounds
Choice Response
Red followed by Red/Yellow 19 24%
Red followed by Blue/Yellow 38 48%
Blue followed by Blue/Yellow 16 20%
Blue followed by Red/Yellow 7 9%
6 Related Literature
In this section we review the previous literature and compare our results with it. First we
examine experiments on ambiguity in games, follwing which we consider experiments related
to the Ellsberg urn.
6.1 Papers on Games
One previous experimental study of the e¤ect of ambiguity in games is Di Mauro and Castro
(2011). They test a result from Eichberger and Kelsey (2002), concerning the e¤ect of ambiguity
on the voluntary provision of public goods. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) show that when the
22We do not consider x = 60; where R is a dominated strategy.
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production function for public goods is concave, ambiguity-aversion causes public good provision
to be above the Nash equilibrium level. More generally they show that the deviation from the
Nash equilibrium depends on the nature of strategic interactions taking place, i.e., on the basis
of whether the game being played was one of strategic substitutes or complements.
Di Mauro and Castro (2011) test this hypothesis in an experiment on voluntary provision of
public goods, which is a game of strategic substitutes. They show that ambiguity rather than
altruism causes an increase in contribution towards the public good. In order to negate the
chance that altruism, or a feeling of reciprocation prompted the subjectsactions, they were
informed that their opponent would be a virtual agent and the opponents play was simulated
by a computer. Subjects played in two scenarios, one with risk, the other with ambiguity. Con-
tributions were signicantly higher when the situation was one of ambiguity. These results are
similar to our ndings and showed that there was indeed evidence that ambiguity signicantly
a¤ects the decisions made by individuals, in a manner that depends directly on the strategic
nature of the game in consideration.
Another paper that tests whether ambiguity a¤ects behaviour in games is Eichberger,
Kelsey, and Schipper (2008). They studied games in which subjects faced either a granny,
who was described as being ignorant of economic strategy, a game theorist, who was described
as a successful professor of economics, or another student as an opponent. It was conjectured
that subjects would view the granny as a more ambiguous opponent than the game theorist.
This was conrmed by the data and ambiguity a¤ected decision choices in the predicted way.
In our paper, even though subjects are paired against one another (and not a granny), we nd
subjects display similar ambiguity averse behaviour.
Colman and Pulford (2007) explain the concept of ambiguity aversion as a state that arises
as a result of a pessimistic response to uncertainty. This is mainly driven by a loss of decision
condence. They argue that people tend to become anxious and less condent while making
decisions in the presence of ambiguity. They found that individual responses di¤ered between
ambiguous and risky versions of the game being studied. Players did not respond to ambiguity
by simply equating it to riskiness, but showed a marked preference to avoid ambiguity whenever
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the option of doing so was provided to them. This is consistent with our ndings that when an
ambiguity-safe option is made available to subjects, they show a marked preference for it.
6.2 Papers on Ellsberg Urns
One of the earliest Ellsberg experiments was conducted by Becker and Brownson (1964). Ambi-
guity was implemented as the number of red balls in an urn. When given the choice between an
ambiguous urn and an unambiguous one, subjects chose the unambiguous urn and were willing
to pay an ambiguity premium of about 60% to avoid ambiguity. Another Ellsberg experiment
conducted by Yates and Zukowski (1976), found subjects to be willing to pay a premium of
20% of the expected value of a bet, in order to bet on a known urn instead of a uniform one. In
our experiments, we found that most subjects were unwilling to bear even the smallest penalty
in order to avoid ambiguity and choose Red :
Bernasconi and Loomes (1992), study a two-stage lottery version of the three-colour Ellsberg
problem, where drawing a red ball (p(R) = 1=3) was the unambiguous event, while drawing
blue and yellow balls were ambiguous separately, but unambiguous together, (p(B[Y ) = 2=3):
Ambiguity aversion was displayed by half the subjects who chose to bet on red for $10. In
addition, 90% of subjects who chose a $10 bet on red, refused to switch to a $12 bet on an
ambiguous colour - thereby implying an ambiguity premium of about 20%. In our experiment,
we framed the ambiguity premium as a penalty on Red (the unambiguous ball) and found that
subjects preferred instead to bet on Blue/Yellow i.e., the ambiguous balls.
7 Conclusions
The Nash equilibrium prediction that R cannot be chosen for 150 < x < 300; was not observed
in our experiments. The ambiguity-safe option R; which is selected by EUA, was the choice of
a majority of subjects when 120 < x < 260: There was also a signicant minority of subjects
choosing R when x = 60: Thus, we nd evidence which is consistent with EUA predictions.
A possible means of testing whether it was indeed ambiguity-aversion prompting the choice
21
of R, would be to run our game in a corresponding "risky" set-up. Analogous to Bohnet,
Greig, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2008), there could be a condition where the Column Player
is told that he is matched against a Computer playing Row.23 Moreover, he is told that the
Computer is playing a mixed strategy, dened by the empirical frequency of the human Row
Players for any given value of x: If the Column Player does not choose R when x > 100 in the
computerised-treatments, it would suggest that his choices in our original-setup experiment are
driven by something other than pure risk-aversion, strengthening our argument that ambiguity-
aversion is at work. However, this is beyond the scope of the present paper and may be an
avenue for future research.
One surprising feature of our results was that the links between choices in the single person
decision and those in the games was not strong. Subjects appeared to perceive a greater level
of ambiguity in a two-person coordination game, than a single person decision problem. More
generally our results suggest that perceptions of ambiguity and even attitudes to ambiguity
depend on context. Hence it may not be possible to measure ambiguity-attitude in one context
and use it to predict behaviour in another.
It is interesting to note that subjects nd more ambiguity regarding real events as op-
posed to actual or simulated Ellsberg urns. It was found that when Ellsberg-type problems
were put to students in a class-environment, a large proportion of PhD-level students were
ambiguity-neutral, while a large proportion of MBA-level students displayed ambiguity-seeking
behaviour.24 However, when asked whether they preferred a payo¤ of $100 if the US President
elected in 2016 was a Democrat (or not a Democrat) or if a fair coin came up heads when tossed
on the day of the election, a large proportion of the students preferred betting on the coin.
One of the reasons put forth to explain this divergence in behaviour is that it is easy to be
Bayesian in an Ellsberg experiment or that the phrasing of the Ellsberg problem might lead
to it being treated as a gamble. However, when asked to make a decision regarding a realistic
scenario such as predicting the next President of the US, the students have no naturalprior.
23We would like to thank our anonymous referee for this suggestion.
24These observations are as recorded by Itzhak Gilboa, in a discussion on observed ambiguity in Ellsberg
experiments.
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A realistic scenario then is better at revealing ambiguity aversion on the part of the subject.
Parallels can be drawn between this discussion and the data we observe from our experiment,
whereby subjects clearly display ambiguity-averse behaviour when put in the scenario of the
coordination game while they fail to do so in the Ellsberg urn rounds. Subjects might be
treating the Ellsberg urn rounds as a gamble, where they readily take a chance. However, when
faced with the task of coordinating with another participant in the environment of a one-shot
game with no previous learning, the subjects have no natural prior on the basis of which to
make their decisions. The Column Player thus selects the strategy that gives a denite payo¤
of x irrespective of the Row Players decision.
One can note that our results support the Dow andWerlang (1994) model of equilibrium un-
der ambiguity, where in the presence of ambiguity players choose their safe strategy, rather than
the model of Lo (1996). Los equilibrium predictions coincide with those of Nash equilibrium
for games with only pure equilibria. Thus for many of our game experiments Los predictions
coincide with Nash equilibrium. Hence for these experiments EUA appears to predict the
implications of ambiguity better.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Part (1) 0 6 x < 75 : By inspection (T;M) and (B;L)
are pure strategy Nash equilibria. Let the probability of Player 1 choosing T (resp. B) be q
(resp. (1   q)); and the probability of Player 2 choosing L (resp. M) be p (resp. (1   p)).
For x in this range, R is dominated by 1
4
 L + 3
4
M; which yields an expected pay-o¤ of 75:
Thus R cannot be played in Nash equilibrium. There are 3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and
(3
4







Part (2) 75 < x 6 100 : For x in this range, (T;M) and (B;L) remain pure strategy
Nash equilibria. Player 2 is indi¤erent betweenM and R when: 100q = x or q = x=100. Player
1 is indi¤erent between T and B when: 300p + 50(1  p) = 55(1  p), or p = 1=61. There are
3 equilibria: (T;M); (B;L) and ( x
100







25There are no equilibria where Player 2 mixes between L and R: Such an equilibrium would require Player
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Part (3) 100 < x < 300 : For this range, M is dominated for Player 2 by R. Once M is
eliminated, Player 1 will never play T; which is now a dominated strategy. He thus plays B.
The best response for Player 2 is to play L. In this case there is a unique Nash equilibrium:
(B;L); which is also an iterated dominance equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Part 1. 0 6 x 6 (1  i)75 : In this range there are two
EUA in pure strategies and one in mixed strategies. In the pure equilibria, the supports of the
equilibrium beliefs are given by (T;M) and (B;L): Consider the rst of these. Dene a capacity,
1; by 1 = (1  1)M (A) ; where M is the additive probability on S2 dened by M (A) = 1
if M 2 A, M (A) = 0 otherwise. Similarly dene Player 2s beliefs 2 by 2 = (1  2)T (A) :
By denition supp 1 = M and supp 2 = T: Denote this equilibrium by hT;Mi : By similar
reasoning we may show that there exists a pure equilibrium where supp 1 = L and supp 2 = B;
which we denote by hB;Li :
Now consider the mixed equilibria. Denote the equilibrium beliefs of Players 1 and 2 re-








~2: Player 2s Choquet expected pay-o¤s








~2 (T ) and V2 (R) = x:





~2 (T ) > (1   ~2)75 > x: Thus R cannot be a best response for Player 2, hence
~1 (R) = 0. Consequently in any mixed equilibrium 2s strategies are L and M:
In a mixed equilibrium Player 2 must be indi¤erent between L and M; hence,









, ~2 (T ) = 3
4
:




: Similarly we may show that for Player 1 to












2 to be indi¤erent between L and R when: 300(1  q) = x or q = 300 x300 . Player 1 is indi¤erent between T and
B when: 100p+ 55(1  p) = 50(1  p). However there is no solution to this equation with a positive value of p;
(p =   595 is a solution)..
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Part 2. (1   i)75 < x < (1   i)100 : In this range, there are two EUA in pure
strategies: (T;M) and (B;L): The reasoning is similar to that used in Part 1 above.
In addition, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium. Denote the equilibrium beliefs of Players 1








~2: Player 2s Choquet expected pay-








~2 (T ) and V2 (R) = x:
Thus L cannot be a best response for Player 2, hence ~1 (L) = 0.26 Consequently in any mixed
equilibrium 2s strategies are M and R:
Player 2 is indi¤erent between M and R when:




~2 (T ) = x














~1 (R) and V1 (B) = 55(1   ~1)~1 (R) : Player 1 is indi¤erent between T and B
when:









~1 (R) = 55(1  ~1)~1 (R)
, ~1 (M) = 1
61
:
26Consider what would happen if Player 2 mixes between L and R: For Player 2 to be indi¤erent between L
and R :









Player 1 is then indi¤erent between playing T and B when,









, 100~1 (L) =  5(1  ~1 (L), ~1 (L) =   5
95
:
It is impossible for a belief to be negative, hence there can be no such equilibria.
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~2 with ~2 (T ) = x(1 ~2)100 and ~2 (B) =
(1 ~2)100   x
(1 ~2)100 ;














Part 3. (1 i)100 < x < (1 i)300 : Denote the equilibrium beliefs of Players 1 and








~2: Player 2s Choquet expected pay-o¤s








~2 (T ) and V2 (R) = x:
For x in this range, V2 (R) > V2 (M) for any beliefs of Player 2, hence ~1 (M) = 0: Player 1s













~1 (R) : Strategy B yields a higher Choquet expected payo¤ than T for any beliefs
of Player 1, with support contained in fL;Rg. For Player 2, L is the best response to B. In
this case there is a unique EUA: hB;Li.









~2: Player 2s Choquet expected pay-o¤s are given








~2 (T ) and V2 (R) = x; where x >
(1  ~2)300:
For x in this range, R strictly dominates both L and M for any beliefs of Player 2, hence
~1 (L) = ~1 (M) = 0: Player 1s best response is to play B; with supp 1 = R: There is a unique
EUA: hB;Ri. 
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